Al-Qaradawi on so-called martyrdom operations : his confusing pros and cons

In his opuscule [i.e. short book], al-Islam wa-al-'Unf (i.e. Islam & Violence), first published by Dar al-Shuruq in 2005 as a herald of the comprehensive study, Fiqh al-Jihad, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi introduces the controversial phenomenon of suicide or martyrdom operations, which he supports but only in certain, very narrowly defined circumstances. What follows is an outline of the pros and cons based on excerpts taken from the second impression in 2007 of the work, to which the page numbers refer.

After discussing the concept of violence and bringing examples of atrocities, either perpetrated or urged, from the history of the Judeo-Christian civilisation from the early biblical period through to the post-colonial era, in a chapter appropriately named al-'Unf wa-al-irhab, al-Qaradawi seeks to distinguish between violence and terrorism.

Are violence and terrorism the same thing? Or is there a difference between them? Some who have spoken on the subject make no distinction between them. In my view, there exists between them a generality and a specificity, as the logicians say. Thus, all terrorism is violent, but not all violence is terrorism. So,in our view, violence is when a group of people use physical force out of place, and use it with no fixed limit in terms of morals or law, be it religious or secular.

هل العنف والإرهاب شيء واحد؟ أم بينهما فرق؟ بعض الذين تحدثوا في الموضوع لم يجعلوا بينهما فرقا. ورأيي: أن بينهما عموما وخصوصا، كما يقول أهل المنطق، فكل إرهاب عنف، وليس كل عنف إرهابا. إذ العنف – فيما رأينا – أن تستخدم فئة من الناس القوة المادية في غير موضعها، وتستخدمها بغير ضابط من خُلُق أو شرع أو قانون.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 27)

Next al-Qaradawi follows his definition of terrorism with numerous examples perpetrated in recent years, including the 9/11 destruction of the Twin Towers in New York.

As for terrorism, it is to use violence against anyone between whom and you there is no issue, rather he is merely a means to terrorise others, to frighten and harm them for some reason or other, to compel them to comply with your demands, even if they are just in your view... And of that [type] is what happened on 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington by way of hijacking civil aircraft with their civilian passengers between whom and the hijackers there existed no problem or dispute, and using the [aircraft] as “offensive weapons”, blowing them up with those inside them, in order to put pressure on, and to influence, American policy.

أما الإرهاب فهو: أن تستخدم العنف فيمن ليس بينك وبينه قضية، وإنما هو وسيلة لإرهاب الآخرين وتخويفهم وإيذائهم بوجه من الوجوه، وإجبارهم على أن يخضعوا لمطالبك، وإن كانت عادلة في رأيك… ومن ذلك ما حدث في ١١ سبتمبر ٢٠٠١ في نيو يورك وواشنطون، من اختطاف الطائرات المدنية بركابها: من المدنيين الذين ليس بينهم وبين خاطفيها مشكلة أو نزاع، واستخدامها "آلة هجوم" وتفجيرها بمن فيها، للضغط والتأثير على السياسة الأمريكية.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 27-28)

Before launching into his argument in favour of what he terms “martyrdom operations”, al‑Qaradawi is careful to set out his credentials as an unflinching opponent of atrocities carried out in the name of Islam, and which fall within his definition of terrorism.

I have issued a fatwa, about ten years ago [i.e. 1995?], declaring haram the hijacking of aircraft; and that was after the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner, trapping its passengers inside, for sixteen days, when one or two of its passengers were killed. Likewise I declared haram the seizing of hostages and threatening to kill them, rejecting what was committed by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, and those hostages had done nothing wrong, except that fate had caused them to fall in their hands. Likewise I issued a declaration following the events of the 11th of September, in which I condemned this act and its perpetrators, whatever was their religion, gender or nationality. Nor is this my personal position, but I drew it from Islam and its sources, including the Quran, Sunnah and principles of Sharia, regardless of school of law.

وقد أصدرت فتوى – منذ بضعة عشر عاما – : بتحريم خطف الطائرات، وذلك بعد حادثة خطف الطائرة الكويتية، وبقاء ركابها فيها محبوسين : ستة عشر يوما، كما قتلوا واحدا أو اثنين من ركابها. كما أفتيت بتحريم حجز الرهائن والتهديد بقتلهم، إنكارا على ما اقترفته جماعة "أبو سياف" في الفلبين، فهؤلاء الرهائن لا جرم لهم، إلا أن القدر أوقعهم في أيديهم. وكذلم أصدرت بيانا – عقب أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر – دِنْتُ فيه هذا العمل ومقترفيه، أيا كان دينهم، أو جنسهم أو وطنهم. وليس هذا موقفا شخصيا مني، ولكني استمددته من الإسلام ومصادره: من قرآنه وسنته، وفقه شريعته، على اختلاف مذاهبه.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 28-29)

The distinction between al-Qaradawi's issuing of a fatwa against the hijacking of civil aircraft and a declaration in the case of the 9/11 atrocity needs explanation. His fatwa is intended to warn any Muslims plotting hijacks in the future that such acts are, as a matter of general principle, unlawful in Islam. However, as regards the perpetrators of 9/11, while it was too late to caution those who killed themselves and thousands of others, it was nevertheless appropriate to condemn their action.

The exposition of what al-Qaradawi considers the lawful use by a Muslim of his or her own body as a weapon appears in the following chapter entitled Bayna al-jihad al-mashru' wa-al-'unf al-mamnu' (i.e. Between lawful jihad and forbidden violence). Here he starts by recognising the need to discriminate between the clarity of purpose and means inherent in armed jihad and the characteristic zeal, fervour and emotion which overwhelm the young, unknowledgeable perpetrators of acts which he considers terrorist.

It is essential here that we distinguish clearly between 'jihad', which Islam has made obligatory on us in defence of our religion, homeland or other sacred objects or sites, and 'violence', which we condemn and criminalise. All jihad and violence uses physical forces to achieve its objective. However, jihad is distinct due to the clarity of its objective and of its means, and its consistency with the rule of law as well as the high moral standards which Islam brought: before, during and after the fighting. As for 'violence', as performed by some groups associated with Islam, it is lacking in clarity of vision, whether in objectives or means, or in legal boundaries. Generally those who engage in it is the zealous youth who is not armed with a deep grasp of either law or reality, and whose emotion and zeal overwhelm his intellect and knowledge. He views people and life through a dark lens, and so is swayed by negative thoughts, and rushes to make accusations of manifest wrongdoing, indeed blatant disbelief, even of major disbelief which expels one from the faith.

ومن اللازم هنا: أن نميز بوضوح بين "الجهاد" الذي فرضه الإسلام دفاعا عن الدين أو الدار (الوطن) أو الحرمات والمقدسات. . وبين "العنف" الذي نَدينه ونجرّمه. فكل من الجهاد والعنف يستخدم القوة المادية في تحقيق هدفه. ولكن الجهاد يتميز بوضوح هدفه، ووضوح وسائله، والتزامه بأحكام الشرع، ومكارم الأخلاق التي جاء بها الإسلام: قبل القتال، وفي أثناء القتال، وبعد القتال. أما "العنف" – كما يقوم به بعض الجماعات التي تنسب إلى الإسلام – فينقصه الوضوح في الرؤية، سواء للأهداف أم للوسائل، أم للضوابط الشرعية، وعامة من يقوم به الشباب المتحمس، الذي لم يتسلح بفقه الشرع، ولا بفقه الواقع، وتغلب عاطفته عقله، وحماسته علمه، ويرى الناس والحياة بمنظار أسود، فيغلب سوء الظن، ويسارع بالاتهام بالفسوق، بل بالكفر الصريح، والكفر الأكبر المخرج من الملة.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 30)

He then goes on to declare the special status of the liberation of Palestine:

Amongst that in with there is no doubt is that the most meritorious form of jihad in our age, and supreme in its legality and excellence, is the jihad to liberate Palestine and the land of the Aqsa Mosque, first of the two qiblahs, third of the Great Sanctuaries, which God linked to the Sacred Mosque, this being the start of the Isra, and that its destination...	ومما لا شك فيه: أن أفضل أنواع الجهاد في عصرنا، وأولاها بالمشروعية والفضل: الجهاد لتحرير فلسطين، وأرض المسجد الأقصى أولى القبلتين، وثالث المسجدين العظيمين، الذي ربطه الله بالمسجد الحرام، فهذا مبتدأ الإسراء، وهذا منتهاه...
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 31)

So, it appears to be it unique place in the history of Islam which distinguishes Palestine from all the main other lands formerly ruled over by Muslims which, according to al‑Qaradawi's argument, imposes a Herculean task on the Palestinians of today.

It is established in jurisprudence that it is an obligation on the Muslims of Palestine to march out, lightly or heavily armed, to repel the disbelieving invader, who has occupied their homeland. That is an absolute obligation on all of them, everyone to the extent that he is able. And in this situation individual rights lapse, so that a woman may go out to jihad and resist without the permission of her husband, the son without that of his father, the servant without that of his master. That is because the collective right to remain and protect it, meaning its freedom and sovereignty, supersedes the individual rights of husbands, fathers and masters.

ومن المقرر فقها: أن على المسلمين في فلسطين أن ينفروا خفافا وثقالا، لطرد العدو الكافر، الذي احتل ديارهم، فهذا فرض عين على جميعهم، كل بما يقدر عليه. وسقط هنا الحقوق الفردية، حتى إن المرأة لتخرج للجهاد والمقاومة بغير إذن زوجها، والابن بغير إذن أبيه، والخادم بغير إذن سيده، لأن حق الجماعة في بقائها والحفاظ عليها – أي على حريتها وسيادتها – مقدم على حقوق الأفراد من الأزواج والآباء والسادة.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 31)

Here every man, woman and child is bound to fight regardless of the evident imbalance of power, until the military objective of liberating the first qiblah of the Muslims, as well as of the Jews and Christians, is achieved. It is instructive to contrast the above vision of Palestinian society with al‑Qaradawi's opening justification of the use martyrdom operations, namely the notion of Israel as a classic militaristic state.

First, Israeli society, by virtue of its imperialist, colonialist, racist, aggressive nature, is a militaristic society to the very core. It is in its entirety a militaristic society, meaning that everyone in it over the age of childhood, be he male or female, is conscripted into the Israeli army. Every Israeli is a soldier in the army, be it actually or as a reservist, capable of being called up at any time for war.

أولا: أن المجتمع الإسرائيلي – بحكم تكوينه الاستعماري الاستيطاني الإحلالي العنصري الاغتصابي – مجتمع عسكري لحما ودما، مجتمع عسكري كله، أي أن كل من جاوز سن الطفولة منه، من رجل أو امرأة، مجند في جيش إسرائيل، كل إسرائيلي جندي في الجيش، إما بالفعل، وإما بالقوة، أي هو جندي احتياط، يمكن أن يستدعي في أي وقت للحرب.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 34)

When stripped of the obvious distinction, namely that most Palestinians are Muslims and most Israelis are Jewish, the chief difference between the two sides in the above two paragraphs by al‑Qaradawi is whether or not children are expected to fight. With that in mind, how solid and how true is the “militaristic society” argument when viewed from the other side? Does al-Qaradawi's argument play into the opponent's hands?

The second argument in favour of martyrdom operations proposed by al-Qaradawi is that Israel is a society of invaders.

Second, Israeli society has a peculiarity which distinguishes it from all other human societies, namely that it is – as regards the people of Palestine – a “society of invaders” who came from outside the region – from Russia, America, Europe or countries of the East – in order to occupy a homeland that did not belong to them, and to expel its people from it, in other words to occupy Palestine and colonise it, expelling its people, ejecting them from their homes by means of armed terrorism, and scattering to the furthest ends of the earth... And the Zionists do not cease to be imperialist, occupying invaders because of the passing of time. If years were to pass it would not alter the facts, nor make lawful what is unlawful, nor justify the crime, nor yet grant “seizure” the quality of legal “ownership” in any way.

ثانيا: أن المجتمع الإسرائيلي له خصوصية تميزه عن غيره من سائر المجتمعات البشرية، فهو – بالنسبة لأهل فلسطين – "مجتمع غزاة" قدموا من خارج المنطقة – من روسيا أو من أمريكا، أو من أوربا أو من بلاد الشرق – ليحتلوا وطنا ليس لهم، ويطردوا شعبه منه، أي ليحتلوا فلسطين ويستعمروها، ويطردوا أهلها، ويخرجوهم من ديارهم بالإرهاب المسلح، ويشتتوهم في آفاق الأرض... ومرور الزمن لا يسقط عن الصهاينة صفة الغزاة المحتلين المستعمرين، فإن مضى السنين لا يغير الحقائق، ولا يحل الحرام، ولا يبرر الجريمة، ولا يعطي "الاغتصاب" صيغة "الملكية" المشروعة بحال.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 34)

Here we need to remember the exception made earlier by al-Qaradawi as regards Palestine because of its place in the early ministry of the Prophet (P). However, the reality is that, even at the time of the Crusades, the Palestinians did not have to bear so onerous a duty alone; and there were times when Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi took the pragmatic step of accepting the Franks' sovereignty and entered into treaties with them while he gathered his forces and strength, as can readily be shown from contemporary chronicles. Similarly, we know that al-Qaradawi's argument is not universal in relation to lands occupied by rapacious invading hordes, not least from Ibn Taymiyah's fatwa on the issue of Mardin.

It is furthermore interesting to compare al-Qaradawi's above statement with his earlier one, in which he contrast the teaching of the Torah (Exodus 20:5) with the Quran.

God (T) says [in the Torah]: “I am the Lord, your God, a jealous God. I visit the sins of the fathers on the sons until the third and fourth generation of those who reject Me.” [Compare] this with the absolute clarity of the Holy Quran in imposing on every human the burden of his [own] actions; and none will be asked about it, or be punished for a sin he committed, except him, even though he be the closest of people to him. The Exalted says: {Every soul stand in pledge for what it has earned} [al-Muddathir: 38] and He says: {Each soul earns only on its [own account], and no bearer bears another's burden} [al-An'am: 164].

يقول الله تعالى [في التوراة]: "لأني أنا الرب إلهك، إله غيور، أفتقد آثام الآباء في البنين، حتى الجيل الثالث والرابع من مبغضيّ." هذا مع أن القرآن الكريم واضح كل الوضوح في تحميل كل إنسان وزر عمله، ولا يسأل عنها غيره، ولا يعاقب على ذنب جناه سواه، ولو كان أقرب الناس إليه. يقول تعالى: {كل نفس بما كسبت رهينة} [المدثر: ٣٨] ويقول: {ولا تكسب كل نفس إلا عليها ولا تزر وازرة وزر أخرى} [الأنعام: ١٦٤].

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 17)

The next point of al-Qaradawi's is that there are only two categories of non-Muslim recognised in the Sharia: hostile and peaceful.

Third, confirming this is [the fact] that the Islamic Sharia – which alone is our reference in all our affairs – describes non-Muslims as being of two types only, with no third type, and they are: the peaceful and the belligerent... As for the first type (the peaceful), to him is owed nothing from the Muslims except kindness and fairness. On the contrary the second type (the belligerent) or (the warlike). They are those whom the jurist call (the warring). And in jurisprudence they have rulings peculiar to them. What is established in law is that (the warlike) is not considered immune in terms of blood and property since, on account of his belligerence and hostility against the Muslims, the immunity of his blood and property lapses.

ثالثا: يؤكد هذا أن الشريعة الإسلامية – التي هي مرجعنا الأوحد في شئوننا كلها – تصف غير المسلمين بأحد وصفين لا ثالث لهما، وهما: مسالم ومحارب... فالصنف الأول (المسالم) ليس له من المسلمين إلا البر والقسط. بخلاف الصنف الثاني (المحارب) أو (الحربي). وهؤلاء هم الذين يسميهم الفقهاء "الحربيين". ولهم في الفقه أحكامهم الخاصة بهم. ومن المقرر شرعا: أن (الحربي) لم يعد معصوم الدم والمال، فقد أسقط بحربه وعدوانه على المسلمين عصمة دمه وماله.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 34-35)

The implication is that anyone associated with hostile non-Muslims, whether combatant or not, is fair game for collective reprisals without discrimination against life, limb and property. This is confirmed by al-Qaradawi's following point, which provides justification of acts of war resulting in “collateral damage”.

Fourth, that is confirmed by the Muslim jurists – or at least the majority of them – have agreed on the permissibility of killing Muslims if the army attacking the Muslims uses them as a human shield... So, if the killing of innocent Muslims has been permitted in order to preserve the main body of Muslims, then the killing of non-Muslims in order to liberate Muslim land from its oppressive occupiers is more lawful and preferable.

رابعا: يؤكد ذلك أن فقهاء المسلمين اتفقوا – أو اتفق جمهورهم – على جواز قتل المسلمين إذا تترس بهم الجيش المهاجم للمسلمين... فإذا أجاز قتل المسلمين الأبرياء للحفاظ على جماعة المسلمين الكبرى، فأن يجوز قتل غير المسلمين، لتحرير أرض المسلمين من محتليها الظالمين: أحق وأولى.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 35-36)

What is missing from this apparently logical conclusion is an acknowledgement of any distinction between the scenario about which the classical scholars wrote and the contemporary situation. The fact is that the claim to lawfulness above rests on scholarly opinion, not on scripture; and there is no guarantee that the mediaeval minds on whom the near consensus was based would have considered the recent phenomenon analogous. The former refers to a battlefield with two armies ranged against each other, or a besieged castle or fortified city, where the non-Muslims integrate captured Muslims into their defensive capabilities. The latter as often as not relates to towns and cities, with unguarded non-combatants going about their daily lives well behind what they perceive as the “front line”. Indeed, what was observed following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is that the governments of numerous Arab and Muslim countries, amongst them Pakistan, strenuously opposed the actions of Saddam Hussein, which famously included the use of human shields.

The fifth argument brought forward by al-Qaradawi addresses this problem by refining his earlier point on Israel as a militaristic society, seeking again to justify treating all members of a hostile nation as participants in the war effort, whether they are combatants or not.

Fifth, contemporary warfare militarises the whole of society, with all its groups and classes, in order to share in the war [effort] and assist in its pursuit, providing the the necessary fuel of material and human energy, so that the warring state may prevail over its enemy. Every citizen in society has a role he must play in helping the conflict, wherever his position. Thus the entire internal front – consisting of professionals, workers and manufacturers – stands behind the warring army, even if it does not bear arms. For this reason, experts say that the Zionist entity – in reality – (Israel) is in its entirety an army.

خامسا: إن الحرب المعاصر تجند المجنمع كله، بكل فئاته وطوائفه، ليشارك في الحرب، ويساعد على استمرارها، وإمدادها بالوقود اللازم من الطاقات المادية والبشرية، حتى تتنصر الدولة المحاربة على عدوها. وكل مواطن في المجتمع عليه دور يؤديه في إمداد المعركة، وهو في مكانه، فالجبهة الداخلية كلها – بما فيها من حرفيين وعمال وصناع – تقف وراء الجيش المحارب، وإن لم تحمل السلاح. ولذا يقول الخبراء: إن الكيان الصهيوني – في الحقيقة – (إسرائيل) كله جيش.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 36)

Here we are expected to ignore the reality that, in most wars, past or present, the majority of a nation's population will wish for their armies to win. Hence, when the Prophet (P) and his Companions made exceptions of certain categories of healthy, adult males from the enemy side, such as peasants, it was not on condition that they disapproved of their anti-Muslim ruler but merely on account of their being non-combatants.

Finally, al-Qaradawi introduces the nub of his argument.

Sixth, that laws are of two types: laws [that apply] in times of plenty and freedom of choice; and laws in times of want and necessity. [Thus] a Muslim is permitted in times of necessity what is not permitted him in times of freedom of choice. For this reason, Exalted God forbade in four verses in His Book: carrion, blood, pork, and [the flesh of] what is sacrificed to other deities. Then He said: {But whoso is compelled, not out of rebelliousness or transgression, there is no sin on him; God is Forgiving, Merciful} [al-Baqarah: 173].	سادسا: أن الأحكام نوعان: أحكام في حالة السعة والاختيار، وأحكام في حالة الضيق والاضطرار، والمسلم يجوز له في حالة الاضطرار ما لا يجوز له في حالة الاختيار، ولهذا حرم الله تعالى في كتابه في أربع آيات: الميتة والدم ولحم الخنزير وما أهل به لغير الله، ثم قال: {فمن اضطرّ غير باغٍ ولا عادٍ فلا إثم عليه إن الله غفور رحيم} [البقرة: ١٧٣].
From this the jurists have deduced a rule: Necessity makes the prohibited permissible. And there is no doubt that our brother in Palestine are in a condition of need. Nay! It is a dire and crushing need to mount these martyrdom operations in order to cause their enemies and the seizers of their land to worry, spreading terror in their hearts, so that they can neither enjoy life nor feel settled, but resolve to depart, returning from whence they came. Were it not thus, the [Palestinians] would be constrained to surrender to whatever humiliation and contempt the Zionist state imposed on them, making them lose everything and granting them nothing.	ومن هنا أخذ الفقهاء قاعدة: الضرورات تبيح المحظورات، وإخوتنا في فلسطين في حالة ضرورة لا شك فيها، بل هي ضرورة ماسة وقاهرة، للقيام بهذه العمليات الاستشهادية، لإقلاق أعدائهم وغاصبي أرضهم، وبث الرعب في قلوبهم، حتى لا يهنأ لهم عيش، ولا يقر لهم قرار، فيعزموا على الرحيل، ويعودوا من حيث ما جاءوا. ولو لا ذلك لكان عليهم أن يستسلموا لما تفرضه عليهم الدولة الصهيونية من مذلة وهوان يفقدهم كل شيء، ولا تكاد تعطيهم شيئا!
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 36)

The counter-arguments to his position above are summarised by al-Qaradawi as follows.

Those who oppose martyrdom operation do so because of three areas of doubt:  1. They fall under suicide, meaning killing oneself, and casting it into destruction; and suicide is among the greatest of taboos in Islam.	الذين يعارضون العمليات الاستشهادية يعارضونها لشبهات ثلاثة: ١ - أنها تدخل في "الانتحار" أي قتل النفس، وإلقائها في التهلكة، والانتحار من أكبر المحرمات في الإسلام.
2. They frequently cause harm to civilians who are not engaged in combat, such as women and children; and Islam prohibits the killing of those even in wars in which armies confront each other. Even the men who are killed are civilians who do not bear arms.	٢ - أنها كثيرا ما تصيب المدنيين الذين لا يحاربون من النساء والأطفال، وهؤلاء يحرم قتلهم في الإسلام، حتى في حرب المواجهة بين الجيوش، وحتى الرجال الذين يُقتلون هم من المدنيين الذين لا يحملون السلاح.
3. They have led to injury and harm being inflicted on the Palestinians on account of the atrocious revenge operations which the state of the Zionist entity (Israel) carries out by way of killing, demolishing, burning and licensing of taboos. So, even if [martyrdom operations] were lawful in in principle, they have become prohibited due to their results and effects. And consideration of the “end results of actions” is required in law.	٣ - أنها أدت إلى إلحاق الأذى والضرر بالفلسطينيين، بسبب عمليات الانتقام الفظيعة التي تقوم بها دولة الكيان الصهيوني (إسرائيل) من قتل وتدمير وإحراق واستباحة للمحرمات. فلو كانت هي مشروعة أصلا لأصبحت محظورة بنتائجها وآثارها. والنظر إلى "مآلات الأفعال" مطلوب شرعا.
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 37)

Considering the three counter-arguments above, al-Qaradawi dismisses the second on the killing of non-combatants by simply referring to his point on Israel as a “militaristic society” as outlined above. This leaves his rebuttal of the first and third counter-arguments. The first, on the equivalence of martyrdom operations with suicide, he tackles as follows.

As for those who opposed martyrdom operations on the grounds that they are a form of “suicide” or “self-killing”, they are absolutely wrong, since the aim is totally different between the “martyrdom-seeker” and the “suicide”. Furthermore, whoever analyses the psyche of the “martyrdom-seeker” and that of the “suicide” will find a wide gulf between them.	فأما الذين يعارضون العمليات الاستشهادية بأنها نوع من "الانتحار" أو "قتل النفس" فهم جد مخطئين، فإن الهدف مختلف تماما بين "الاستشهادي" وبين "المنتحر". ومن ناحية أخرى: من يحلل نفسية "الاستشهادي" ونفسية "المنتحر" يجد بينهما بونا شاسعا.
The suicide kills himself for his own purposes, be it some failure in a business deal, in love, in an exam, or some such. Too weak to confront the situation, he decides to flee life through death.	فالمنتحر يقتل نفسة من أجل نفسه، لإخفاقه في صفقة أو في حب أو في امتحان، أو غير ذلك، فضعف عن مواجهة الموقف، فقرر الهرب من الحياة بالموت.
As for the martyrdom-seeker, he does not look to himself; rather he engages in sacrifice for a greater cause, alongside which all other sacrifices become insignificant. He sells himself for the sake of God, in order to purchase paradise thereby, on which the Exalted has said: {God redeems from the believers their souls and possessions in return for paradise} [al-Tawbah: 111].	أما الاستشهادي، فهو لا ينظر إلى نفسه، إنما يضحي من أجل قضية كبيرة، تهون في سبيلها كل التضحيات، فهو يبيع نفسه لله، ليشتري بها الجنة، وقد قال تعالى: {إن الله اشترى من المؤمنين أنفسهم وأموالهم بأن لهم الجنة} [التوبة: ١١١].
So, while the suicide dies fleeing and retreating, the martyrdom-seeker dies advancing and attacking.	فإذا كان المنتحر يموت فارا منسحبا، فإن الاستشهادي يموت مقداما مهاجما.
And while the suicide has not goal but to flee from confrontation, the martyrdom-seeker has a clear goal, which is to realise the pleasure of God Exalted. As the Exalted has said: {And among people is he who sells his soul desirous of God's pleasure; and God is Gentle with [His] servants} [al-Baqarah: 207].	فإذا كان المنتحر لا غاية له إلا الفرار من المواجهة، فإن الاستشهادي له غاية واضحة، وهي تحقيق مرضاة الله تعالى، كما قال تعالى: {ومن الناس من يشري نفسه ابتغاء مرضاة الله والله رءوف بالعباد} [البقرة: ٢٠٧].
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 37-38)

When considering the above rebuttal that killing oneself in a martyrdom operation does not amount to suicide on account of the difference of intention, one is bound to ask how this differs from the intention of those who claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attack on civilians in Israel's closest ally which, as we have seen, al-Qaradawi flatly condemns. Nor can one ignore his following statement from later in the book in a section entitled Husn al-niyah la yubarriru al-a'mal al-ta'ishah [i.e. Good intentions do not excuse reckless acts], where he addresses the issue of acts of violence carried out by extremists within Muslim states, where most of the victims of martyrdom operations by Muslims have perished.

The Messenger of Islam (P) warned against reckless acts and rash behaviour, which good people may sometimes indulge in with good intentions and noble motives without considering the end results [sic?] of thinking about their disastrous consequences. That is because of their short-sightedness and the narrowness of their horizons. And so long as society does not pay attention to them and seize their hands to prevent them from continuing in their inflammatory line of thinking, they will destroy the whole of society; and – for all their good intentions – their recklessness will end up with the whole group along with them.

ولقد حذر رسول الإسلام صلى الله عليه وسلم من الأعمال الطائشة، والتصرفات الرعناء، التي قد يقوم بها بعض الناس الطيبين، بنوايا حسنة، وبواعث نبيلة، دون أن ينظروا في مآلاتها، ويفكروا في وخيم عواقبها، وذلك لقصر نظرهم، وضيق أفقهم، فما لم يتنبه المجتمع لهم، ويأخذ على أيديهم، ويمنعهم من الاستمرار في نفكيرهم الأحرق، فإنهم سيودون بالمجتمع كله، ينتهي بهم طيشهم – مع حسن نيتهم – إلى هلاك الجماعة كلها معهم.

(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 49-50)

As regards violence perpetrated by zealous but misguided Muslim youths against Muslim society, al-Qaradawi quotes the Prophet's (P) famous allegory of people travelling by ship.

Narrated by al-Nu'man ibn Bashir (RA) that God's Messenger (P) said: “Those who stick to the limits [set by] God and those who fall foul of them are like people who draw lots on a ship: some end up above, and some end up below. Whenever those below need water to drink, they clamber over those above them; so they say [to themselves]: 'Suppose we pierce a hole on our deck. That way we don't annoy those above us.' Now, if those [above] left those [below] to do as they wished, they would all perish. However, if they stopped them [from doing wrong], not only would they save themselves, but they would all be saved.”	عن النعمان بن بشير رضي الله عنهما، أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: "مثل القائم على حدود الله، والواقع فيها، كمثل قوم استهموا على سفينة، فأصاب بعضهم أعلاها، وبعضهم أسفلها إذا استقوا من الماء مروا على من فوقهم، فقالوا: لو أنا خرقنا في نصيبنا خرقا، ولم نؤذ من فوقنا! فإن تركهم وما أرادوا هلكوا جميعا، وإن أخذوا على أيديهم نجوا، ونجوا جميعا".
The hadith makes clear to us the shared, mutual responsibility of the Ummah, and that it is not permitted to leave some of its sons to bring about its sinking because of their ignorance and erroneous behaviour, even if they are sincere. Sincerity on its own is not sufficient; rather, along with sincerity, one must enquire after what is right.	إن الحديث يبين لنا المسؤولية التضامنية المشتركة للأمة، وأنها لا يجوز لها أن تدع بعض أبنائها يتسببون في غرقها بجهلهم وسوء تصرفهم، وإن كانوا مخلصين، فالإخلاص لا يكفي وحده، ولكن لا بد من تحري الصواب مع الإخلاص.
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 50)

The relevance of this hadith to the situation he describes is not in doubt. What is odd, however, is why al-Qaradawi does not apply the hadith equally to the illegal Zionist occupation of Palestinian lands where, it could be argued, a minority of hotheaded individuals insist on pursuing attacks which, because of the imbalance not of resolve but of resources, have no chance of success. Certainly, as history quite clearly shows, Salah al-Din did not succeed in recapturing Jerusalem from the Crusaders by squandering his limited resources by repeatedly attacking impregnable targets, or by adopting the contemporary form of martyrdom operations developed by the heterodox Nusayri Ismaili sect. Instead he bided his time, concluding temporary peace treaties with his enemy, and ceding territory to them, whenever he deemed it strategically propitious so to do.

The third counter-argument above on the causing of harm to the people of Palestine, al-Qaradawi tackles by asserting that Israel's disproportionate aggression is a product of its very nature and so would continue regardless of any Palestinian attacks.

As for the accusation of harming the Palestinians, and that it rebounds on them in [the form of] killing, demolition and burning on account of the Zionist revenge operations, as Israel's reach is longer, its capability for revenge is more powerful, and can [respond for every] measure twofold, tenfold even. To this we reply as follows:	وأما شبهة الإضرار بالفلسطين، وأنها عادت عليهم بالقتل والتدمير والإحراق، بسبب عمليات الانتقام الصهيونية، فإن ذراع إسرائيل أطول، وقدرتها على الانتقام أقوى وهي يكيل بالصاع صاعين، بل عشرة أصوع. فنجيب هنا بما يلي:
first, that Israel has always been the initiator of evil and harm...	أولا: أن إسرائيل كانت دائما هي البادية بالشر والأذى...
second, that this hostility is innate in Israel, since its founding to today. Indeed, it only survives by means of massacres and giving licence to [attacks on] blood, religious objects and property...	ثانيها: أن هذا العدوان طبيعة في إسرائيل، منذ قامت وإلى اليوم. بل هي لم تقم إلا على المجازر والاستباحة للدماء والحرمات والأموال...
third, we should not exaggerate the effect of the Israeli strikes on Palestine, while neglecting the effects of the martyrdom strikes on the entity of the tribe of Zion...	ثالثها: لا ينبغي أن نضخم في أثر الضربات الإسرائيلية على الفلسطين، ونغفل آثار الضربات الاستشهادية في كيان بني صهيون...
That is what made Israel and, behind it, America attempt, with all their effort and wiles, to stop the martyrdom operations at any price. And hence also the incitement of the Palestinian Authority to strike at the resistance and to rid itself of it by claiming to resist terrorism.	وهو ما جعل إسرائيل وأمريكا من ورائها تحاولان بكل جهد وحيلة: إيقاف العمليات الاستشهادية بأي ثمن، ومن ذلك تحريض السلطة الفلسطينية على ضرب المقاومة والتخلص منها بدعوى مقاومة الإرهاب.
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 38-39)

What we seen in the above points is that al-Qaradawi's exception in favour of martyrdom operations in the specific context of the Palestinian lands seized by Zionists in 1948 in order to form the Jewish state of Israel, or subsequently illegally occupied and settled by them contradicts many of the reasons given by former extremist Muslims in Egypt for renouncing violence, and of which al-Qaradawi approves. He summarises the ten-point renunciation of some of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah earlier justifications as follows.

1st preventer: that there is near certainty that the Jihad, fighting or armed conflict will not realise the benefit associated with it, and for which it was started.	المانع الأول: أن يغلب على الظن أن الجهاد أو القتال أو الصدام المسلح لن يحقق المصلحة المتوخاة منه، والتي شرع من أجلها.
2nd preventer: if the fighting runs contrary to the [principle of] guiding the general populace – or, indeed, becomes off-putting to them.	المانع الثاني: إذا تعارض القتال مع هداية الخلق. (بل ربما أصبح منفر لهم).
3rd preventer: inability, meaning lack of capability, since all requirements lapse due to inability: {So fear God as much as you can} [al-Taghabun: 16].	المانع الثالث: العجز، أي عدم القدرة، لكل الواجبات تسقط بالعجز: {فاتقوا الله ما استطعتم} [التغابن: 16].
4th preventer: [self-]destruction, as the Exalted has said: {And cast not [yourselves]by your [own] hands into destruction} [al-Baqarah: 195].	المانع الرابع: التهلكة، كما قال تعالى: {ولا تُلقوا بأيديكم إلى التهلكة} [البقرة: 195].
5th preventer: the presence of one or more Muslims in the ranks of the idolaters, since the sanctity of that Muslim who has mingled with the idolaters and is indistinguishable from them renders [sic?] their blood and touching [i.e. harming] them unlawful to protect the Muslims in their midst. On this the Exalted has said: {Were it not for believing men and believing women whom you do not know...} [al-Fath: 25].	المانع الخامس: وجود مسلم أو مسلمين في صفوف المشركين، فإن حرمة دم هذا المسلم الذي اختلط بالمشركين ولم يتميز عنهم: تصون دماء هؤلاء، وتحرم المساس بهم حماية للمسلمين معهم، وفي هذا يقول القرآن: {ولو لا رجال مؤمنون ونساء مؤمنات لم تعلموهم أن تطئوهم فتصيبكم منهم معرة بغير علم ليدخل الله في رحمته من يشاء لو تزيلوا لعذبنا الذين كفروا منهم عذابا أليما} [الفتح: 25].
6th preventer: the disbelievers' uttering of the two creedal statements; the repentance and return of an apostate to Islam; and the return of the disobedient to obedience.	المانع السادس: نطق الكفار بالشهادتين، وتوبة المرتد ورجوعه إلى الإسلام. ورجوع العاصي إلى الطاعة.
7th preventer: if the evils and tribulations associated with the fighting outweigh the benefits, or if the benefits which are lost are greater than those gained.	المانع السابع: إذا كانت المفاسد والفتن المترتبة على القتال أعلى من المصالح المتوقعة منه.. أو إذا كان ما يضيعه من المصالح أعظم مما يجلبه منها.
8th preventer: and this is peculiar to the People of the Book, in summary: if they pay the jizyah to the ruler, and a contract of protection is concluded, fighting must cease regardless of whether what they pay is called jizyah or not. And so long as they manifest their desire to enter into a contract of protection with the Muslims, they must be responded to,and fighting must cease; so if they do that, then they will have their rights and duties, and we ours.	المانع الثامن: وهو خاص بأهل الكتاب، وخلاصته: أنهم إذا أدوا الجزية إلى الحاكم، وعقد لهم عقد الذمة، امتنع قتالهم، سواء دفعوا إليه باسم الجزية أم غيرها، فما داموا قد أبدوا رغبتهم في الدخول مع المسلمين في عقد ذمة: وجب إجابتهم، وامتنع قتالهم. فإن فعلوا ذلك، فلهم ما لنا، وعليهم ما علينا.
9th preventer: failure of da'wah [i.e. the call of Islam] to reach [them], as it is impermissible to fight whoever has not received da'wah.	المانع التاسع: عدم بلوغ الدعوة، ولا يجوز قتال من لم تبلغه الدعوة.
10th preventer: the concluding of a treaty – and treaties are a boon. Sheikh al-Haskafi said in al-Durr al-Mukhtar Sharh Tanwir al-Absar: “Abandoning Jihad against them is permitted in return for tribute from either them or us, if that is better, due to the word of the Exalted: {And if they sue for peace, then sue you for it [also]; and place your trust in God}” [al-Anfal: 61], [on which] Ibn Abidin said in his gloss: “and the verse is, by consensus, bound up with the notion of benefit.” Such a treaty, when it comes into effect, fighting ceases regardless of whether it be a temporary treaty or otherwise.	المانع العاشر: عقد الصلح، والصلح خير، قال الشيخ الحصكفي في الدر المختار شرح تنوير الأبصار: ويجوز الصلح على ترك الجهاد معهم بمال منهم أو منا، لو خيرا، لقوله تعالى: {وإن جنحوا للسلم فاجنح لها وتوكل على الله} [الأنفال: 61]، قال ابن عابدين في حاشيته: والآية مقيدة برؤية المصلحة إجماعا. وهذا الصلح متى أبرم: امتنع القتال، سواؤ كان الصلح مؤقتا أم غير مؤقت.
(al-Islam wa-al-'Unf / al-Qaradawi, p. 56-57)

While al-Qaradawi presents these ten 'preventers' in the context of a renunciation of Muslim-on-Muslim violence, and although some such as 6, 8 &9 are clearly inapplicable to the Israeli-Arab conflict, nevertheless it is certainly arguable that 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 apply equally in the case of Palestine, if not 10 also because of the treaties that exist between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, which he earlier disparaged (see quotation from p. 39 above), as well as between it and Egypt and Jordan. Exactly why al-Qaradawi ignores these points when approving the launching of martyrdom operations by Palestinian against Israelis remains unexplained.

Of course, it is all very well to mention the above flaws, but their existence alone do not constitute proof that martyrdom operations are contrary to Islam and the Sharia. However, there is clearly a lack of consistency in his logic. If a contemporary scholar of the learning, intellectual calibre and standing of al-Qaradawi cannot construct an argument in favour of the limited use of martyrdom operations without repeatedly contradicting himself within the space of sixty pages, what hope is there that a watertight justification can be produced by the significantly lesser scholars on whom the extremists depend?

The opinion put forward by al-Qaradawi is that martyrdom operations, though unjustifiable anywhere else in the world, even in the USA, Israel's foremost ally, are exclusively permissible against the Zionist entity in order to secure the liberation of Jerusalem. As an argument, it is not only attractive to Muslims who desire revenge, but it appears logically unassailable because of the Aqsa Mosque's unique place in Islam, being the site of the first qiblah and of the Prophet's Night Journey (Isra & Mi'raj). However, if one measures al-Qaradawi's human argument against the practice of the Prophet based on divine revelation, we find that the Sacred Mosque in Makkah too has a unique place in Islam, was the site of the second qiblah and is also intimately linked to the Isra and Mi'raj, as well as being founded by Abraham (PBUH) as the first house of worship dedicated to worship of God alone. Despite this, the Muslims were forbidden from carrying out the sort of attacks on non-Muslims that al-Qaradawi declares lawful, but which have no realistic, foreseeable chance of success. Instead they were instructed to be patient, then to emigrate, only returning triumphant in a virtually bloodless conquest years later when they had not only a strong moral case (like the Palestinians) but had also (unlike the Palestinians) entered into a peace treaty by which the Muslims of Medina were all bound, allowing them to muster the overwhelming military strength required to defeat their Meccan foe at their first faux pas. Clever scholasticism aside, perhaps the most convincing evidence against martyrdom-operations remains, as with all extremist positions, the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH) and the example of his Companions.